One of the currently most discussed themes in the philosophy of action is whether there is some kind of collective intention that explains what groups do independent of what the indi-viduals who make up the group intend and do. One of the main obstacles to solve this prob-lem is that on the one hand collective intentionality is no simple summation, aggregate, or dis-tributive pattern of individual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim), while on the other hand collective intentionality is in the heads (...) of the participating individuals, so to speak, and so it is owned by each of the separate individuals who make up the group (the Individual Ownership Claim). The claims are contradictory and until now no satisfactory solution how to reconcile them has been found. In this article I argue that the constitution view, like the one developed by Lynne R. Baker, can provide a way to sidestep the contradiction. Just as a statue as such is constituted by the marble it is made of but has characteristics that are different from the mar-ble (a statue has a head and legs, while the marble hasn’t; while the marble is stony and the statue as such isn’t), I argue that a group is constituted by its members and that a group on the one hand and its members on the other hand have different characteristics. This is possible be-cause group and members are on different levels. Then there is no longer a contradiction be-tween the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Claim, for the former claim con-cerns the group level and the latter claim concerns the level of the group members. This ex-plains that a group can have intentions that are no simple summation, aggregate, or distributive patterns of the intentions of its members and that group intentions can be different from if not contradictory to what the individual members taken together intend. (shrink)

of “Reason and the structure of Davidson’s ‘Desire-Belief-Model’ ” by Henk bij de Weg In the present discussion in the analytic theory of action, broadly two models for the explanation or justification of actions can be distinguished: the internalist and the externalist model. Against this background, I discuss Davidson’s version of the internalist Desire-Belief Model . First, I show that what Davidson calls “pro attitude” has two distinct meanings. An implication of this is that Davidson’s DBM actually comprises two (...) different models: the “classical” DBM and a model that has an extra premise, the “nonclassical” model. However, from another point of view one can say that the classical DBM is the nonclassical model in which a premise is missing. In order to determine which viewpoint is correct, I introduce Schütz’s distinction between “because-motives” and “in-order-to-motives”. With the help of this distinction, I can show that the classical DBM is an incomplete version of the nonclassical model. Besides of the premise that refers to the agent’s pro attitude, we need this extra premise in order to refer to the occasion as experienced by the agent that makes him or her act. Only then can we fully explain or justify an action. (shrink)

In his work on reasons Dretske argues that reasons are only worthwhile for having them if they are causally relevant for explaining behaviour, which he elaborates in his representational theory of explanation. The author argues against this view by showing that there are reasons that are relevant for explaining behaviour but not causally relevant. He gives a linguistic foundation of his argumentation and shows that Dretske’s representational theory cannot explain human actions because man does not only perceive things that have (...) already meaning but also assigns meanings to what (s)he perceives and that therefore reasons are fundamentally different from causes. (shrink)

In studying what people do two points of view can be distinguished: We can choose the perspective of the actors themselves (the actor’s perspective), or we can look at what is going on from the outside, from a distance (the researcher’s perspective). Regarding the relation between both points of view three standpoints have been defended.

Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and (...) that the body is an intrinsic part of what I am as a person. (shrink)

In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are (...) different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind. (shrink)

In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from (...) each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception. (shrink)

People often do things together and form groups in order to get things done that they cannot do alone. In short they form a collectivity of some kind or a group, for short. But if we consider a group on the one hand and the persons that constitute the group on the other hand, how does it happen that these persons work together and finish a common task with a common goal? In the philosophy of action this problem is often (...) solved by saying that there is a kind of collective intention that the group members have in mind and that guides their actions. Does such a collective intention really exist? In this article I’ll show that the answer is “no”. In order to substantiate my view I’ll discuss the approaches of Bratman, Gilbert and Searle on collective intention. I’ll put forward four kinds of criticism that undermine the idea of collective intention. They apply mainly to Bratman and Gilbert. First, it is basically difficult to mark off smaller groups from bigger unities. Second, most groups change in membership composition over time. Third, as a rule, on the one hand groups are internally structured and on the other hand they belong to a larger structure. It makes that generally it cannot be a collective intention that moves the actions of the members of a group. Fourth, conversely, most individual actions cannot be performed without the existence of a wider context of agents who support these actions and make them possible. My critique on Searle mainly involves that in his approach his idea of collective intention is superfluous and that he is not radical enough in his idea that collective action is based on coordinated individual intentions and actions. However, it is a good starting point for showing how collective action actually functions, especially when combined with Giddens’s structuration theory. Every agent in a group executes his or her own individual intentions, relying on what the group offers to this agent and asks from him or her. In this way individual actions of the members of a group are coordinated and it makes that the group can function and that its goals can be performed. And in this way the group is produced and reproduced by fitting individual actions together. An individual agent who belongs to a group only needs to know what s/he wants and what s/he has to do in the group, even if s/he has no knowledge of the intentions and commitments of the other members. Then he or she can do things together with others in a group without supposing that there is something like a collective intention. (shrink)

One of the most discussed articles in the theory of knowledge is Edmund Gettier’s article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, published in 1963. In this article Gettier undermined the view that knowledge is justified true belief. I think that Gettier’s analysis has consequences not only for the question what knowledge is but also for our idea of truth. In this paper I argue that an analysis in the sense of Gettier shows that a statement can be both true and not (...) true at the same time. (shrink)

JOHANNES ROESSLER & NAOMI EILAN (Eds.)Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003ISBN 0199245622 (pbk, 415 pages, $39.95)In The Principles of Psychology, William James presents an interesting case of a ‘...

In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are (...) different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind. (shrink)

Analyse van het denken van de Franse filosoof (1926-1984).

In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht hoe het vrouwelijke wordt ingezet bij een herwaardering van de menselijkheid. Daarvoor wordt de betekenis van het vrouwelijke in de filosofie van Emmanuel Levinas bestudeerd. In zijn werk zijn met name drie vrouwelijke gestalten die de weg van de subjectiviteit tot de transcendentie markeren. Aan elk van die gestalten wordt een deel van de studie gewijd. Tevens wordt ter vergelijking een tekst van Hegel besproken en twee teksten van Luce Irigaray geanalyseerd.

Heidegger ist durch seinen eigenwilligen Sprachgebrauch einer der dunkelsten Denker unserer Zeit. Dies ist jedoch kein Zeichen von Willkür oder unbegründeter Sucht nach Ürsprünglichkeit, für ihn hängt die Sprache wesentlich mit seinem Philosophieren zusammen (1). Vor allem ist von Seiten der angloamerikanischen Sprachanalytiker an diesem Sprachgebrauch viel Kritik geübt, u.a. durch Carnap. Ausdrücke wie „das Nichtige nichtet” finden in den empirischen Situationen kein Echo, entziehen sich der Methode der Verifikation, erfüllen keine einzige Wahrheitsvoraussetzung und können keine Protokollsätze sein (2). Dennoch, (...) Heideggers Methode kann, vermöge der Art seiner Untersuchung, der Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins, nicht die der logischen Analyse sein ; sie ist die phänomenologische Methode, die für die Ontologie in ihren Fragen nach dem Sinn des Seins die angemessenste Methode ist (3). Heidegger meint, daß die Vorsokratiker in ihrer dichterischen Formgebung dem ursprünglichen Sinn des Seins äußerst nahegekommen sind. Seine Intention beschränkt sich nicht allein auf eine etymologische Analyse von Begriffen wie „physis”, „logos”, „aletheia” usw., wodurch er das Sein zu entbergen sucht, er will mit dieser Analyse auch und vor allem ein neues Fundament legen für unser heutiges Denken und unsere Einstellung dem Sein gegenüber (4). Um dies deutlich zu machen, wählen wir Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit dem Logosbegriff bei Heraklit im Fragment 50 (Diels), den er in Vorträge und Aufsätze III (Pfüfflingen 1967, S. 3-25) einer minuziösen Untersuchung unterzieht. Heidegger fragt sich, was die ursprüngliche Bedeutung von Logos ist, und er sucht zu beweisen, daß „legein” nicht ursprünglich „sprechen” bedeutet, sondern in dem deutschen „legen” (vorlegen, darlegen, überlegen) wiedergefunden wird, „legein” konnte sprechen bedeuten, weil sprechen besagt : „Beisammen-vor-uns-liegen-lassen”. Deshalb kann nach Heidegger die Sprache nicht als „Verlautbarung” oder „Bedeuten” gedeutet werden. Ausdruck und Bedeutung sind beide Phänomene der Sprache als das „Beisammen-voruns-liegen-lassen” des Unverborgenen in seiner Unverborgenheit. Das Sprechen muß nach Heidegger den Spielraum der Unverborgenheit, mit dem das Hören korrespondieren muß, offenlassen. Das Hören nach dem Logos ist ein „homologein”, dem Logos zugehörig. Ist man dem Logos zugehörig, so ist man in dem Sinne weise, daß man sich in das schickt (geschicklich), was dem Menschen zugewiesen ist : Heidegger widersetzt sich der herrschenden Interpretation von Fr. 50. Das „Eins-Alles” zielt nicht auf den Inhalt der Verkündigung des Logos, sondern vielmehr auf die Weise, in der der Logos anwesend ist, die Weise, in der er wirkt und wohl als das Eine, das alles ausschließt, das lichtende Sammeln, Zusammentragen, das Bergen aller Gegebenheiten in die Offenheit der Welt. Er birgt und entbirgt. Unverborgenheit und Verborgenheit sind Pole dieses einen Seinsereignisses. So bleiben die Gegensätze innerhalb des Lichtkreises der Unverborgenheit bestehen und aufeinander angewiesen. Heidegger identifiziert den Logos mit dem „Hen-Panta”, weil „ Hen-Panta” sagt, was der Logos ist, und der Logos sagt, wie „Hen-Panta” anwesend ist. Wenn der Mensch die Sprache des Logos spricht, sammelt er auch die Dinge, läßt er sie vor-sichliegen, bringt er die Anwesenheit der Dinge in ihrem Anwesen zur Sprache, läßt sie zu ihrem Recht kommen, dabei durch das ursprüngliche „Einen” des Logos geleitet, das „Hen-Panta” ist. Heidegger weist darauf hin, daß dies kein pantheistischer Gedankengang ist. Heraklit will, so meint er, vor dem Geheimnis dieser Worte stehenbleiben, um so das Geheimnis als Geheimnis zu erkennen. Er meint, daß der durch die Vorsokratiker geöffnete Weg durch die Denkentwicklung seit Plato verschleiert geblieben ist. Heidegger sieht in Fr. 50 von Heraklit den stammelnden Ausdruck des noch nicht in Subjekt und Objekt aufgeteilten Seins. In dem Wort Logos dachte Heraklit das Sein des Seienden. Dieses Licht verblaßte schnell. Für Heidegger liegt die große Bedeutung Heraklits in dessen Anregung, in Übereinstimmung mit der Logossprache zu sprechen und den Weg einzuschlagen, den er uns gezeigt hat durch ein uns Offenhalten für das entbergendverbergende Sein (5). Auf wirklich geniale Weise hat Heidegger der Logosphilosophie die Gewalt seines eigenen Denkens verliehen. Diese Auslegung lehrt uns mehr über seine eigene Philosophie, als über die Heraklits. Heidegger ist gefesselt durch das mystisch-prophetische Element in Heraklits Philosophieren. So wie Heraklit der Dolmetscher der Masse sein will, die dem Logos widerspricht, obwohl sie fortwährend darüber spricht, so fühlte Heidegger sich berufen ein Hermeneut zu sein, auf dem durch die Seinsvergessenheit verdunkelten Weg des denkens nach einem neuen (An) denken des Seins. Betroffen ist Heidegger durch die Idee der Einheit, die sich in dem Logos erschließt. Der Logos offenbart sich in der Welt durch Gegensätze, in denen die Einheit sich fortwährend erneuert. Das Denken Heideggers ist von Anfang an auf das Ans-Licht-bringen des (oft) vergessenen, verborgenen Zusammenhängens gerichtet, in dem alles was ist erscheint. Aus dieser Interpretation wird deutlich, wie wertvoll eine Konfrontation der eigenen Zeit mit der Vergangenheit sein kann, angesichts der Gratie, durch die die Geschichte der Philosophie aktuell bleibt (6). Unser großes Bedenken gegen diese Interpretation ist, daß Heidegger sich keine Rechenschaft über die textkritischen Schwierigkeiten dieses Textes gegeben hat. Es ist die Frage, ob wohl Logos im ursprünglichen Text gestanden hat. Wir haben versucht, dies aufzuzeigen. Gleichfalls ist es sehr bedenklich, daß Heidegger „legein” und „legen” etymologisch im Zusammenhang sieht, was deshalb nicht möglich ist, weil beide Wörter auf im Wesen verschiedene indoeuropäische Wurzeln zurückgehen. Unsere Schlußfolgerung ist, daß Heideggers Auslegung von Fr. 50 uns mehr über die Philosophie von Heidegger selbst, als über die Logosphilosophie von Heraklit lehrt. Es ist besonders zu bedauern, daß Heidegger, der sich gerne rühmt die Belange der Wissenschaftlichkeit zu vertreten, die für die Interpretation griechischer Texte unentbehrliche philologische Vorarbeit vernachlässigt hat. (shrink)

Wat gebeurt er allemaal in relaties? We raken gefrustreerd wanneer een vriend niet terugbelt. We missen een geliefde die ver weg is. We komen elkaar tegen op straat. We vrijen. We voelen ons eenzaam. Soms terwijl we vrijen. We voelen ons diep met iemand verbonden. We verwachten veel. We doen ons best om niet te veel te verwachten. Soms lukt dat, en dan kunnen we elkaar echt ontmoeten. Dit boek gaat over de spanningen die in elke relatie aanwezig zijn. In (...) romantische relaties, maar ook in andere. Je verhoudt je tot de anderen en tot jezelf. Maar je verhoudt je ook tot de verhouding zelf. Dat is een nieuw idee in de cognitiewetenschappen. Daar gaat het veel vaker over kennen, dan over liefhebben. Maar wat als kennen en liefhebben eigenlijk heel dicht bij elkaar zouden liggen? In dit boek breekt cognitiefilosoof Hanne De Jaegher een lans om kennen en liefhebben samen te bestuderen. Want allebei zijn het geëngageerde relaties vol spanningen. Zo schrijft de auteur een wonderlijk nieuw hoofdstuk in de filosofie van de liefde. (shrink)

The present paper draws on climate science and the philosophy of science in order to evaluate climate-model-based approaches to assessing climate projections. We analyze the difficulties that arise in such assessment and outline criteria of adequacy for approaches to it. In addition, we offer a critical overview of the approaches used in the IPCC working group one fourth report, including the confidence building, Bayesian and likelihood approaches. Finally, we consider approaches that do not feature in the IPCC reports, including three (...) approaches drawn from the philosophy of science. We find that all available approaches face substantial challenges, with IPCC approaches having as a primary source of difficulty their goal of providing probabilistic assessments. (shrink)

Tijdens zijn bewogen leven schreef Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert (1522-1590) vele teksten en voerde hij talloze gesprekken. Zijn doel: zijn medemensen overtuigen van het belang om niet slaafs achter anderen aan te lopen maar zélf na te denken. Want elk mens heeft voldoende redelijke vermogens om het leven zelfstandig vorm te geven en het goede te doen. De Kruidhofjes bevat twee bundels met dialogen – gesprekken die Coornhert zelf voerde of onderweg heeft gehoord. De dialogen zijn te zien als medicijnen tegen (...) wat Coornhert zag als de ziekte van zijn tijd: onnadenkendheid en religieuze scherpslijperij. Enerzijds probeert Coornhert obstakels voor een goed en gelukkig persoonlijk leven weg te halen. Hier gaat het vooral om het bestrijden van onbegrip en onwetendheid. Anderzijds probeert Coornhert obstakels voor vreedzaam samenleven op te ruimen. Dat is de reden waarom nogal wat dialogen ingaan op religieuze kwesties als kerkbezoek, de mis en kerkelijke ceremonies; onenigheid over deze onderwerpen vormde immers de belangrijkste oorzaak van de heftige onderdrukking, vervolging en oorlog in de zestiende eeuw. Dit verklaart ook de felheid van veel van de dialogen. Discussies over religieuze denkbeelden en gebruiken waren niet zomaar interessant tijdverdrijf voor bij de borrel. Het ging ergens om: om de waarheid, je zielenheil en de inrichting van de maatschappij. In 45 dialogen probeert Coornhert zo zijn medemens te motiveren tot eerlijkheid naar zichzelf en verdraagzaamheid naar de ander. (shrink)

This volume includes the critical edition of five apologias in which Erasmus defended his New Testament translation and commentary against Diego López de Zúñiga and Sancho Carranza. The edition is partly based on manuscript sources never used before.

This article examines the role of philosophy in the development of the kinetic theory of gases. Two opposing accounts of this role, by Peter Clark and John Nyhof, are discussed and criticized. Contrary to both accounts, it is argued that philosophical views of scientists can fundamentally influence the results of their scientific work. This claim is supported by a detailed analysis of the philosophical views of Maxwell and Boltzmann, and of their work on the kinetic theory, especially concerning the so-called (...) specific heat anomaly. It leads to the conclusion that the scientific development of the kinetic theory cannot be understood without taking into account the role of philosophy. (shrink)

While the relation between visualization and scientific understanding has been a topic of long-standing discussion, recent developments in physics have pushed the boundaries of this debate to new and still unexplored realms. For it is claimed that, in certain theories of quantum gravity, spacetime ‘disappears’: and this suggests that one may have sensible physical theories in which spacetime is completely absent. This makes the philosophical question whether such theories are intelligible, even more pressing. And if such theories are intelligible, the (...) question then is how they manage to do so. In this paper, we adapt the contextual theory of scientific understanding, developed by one of us, to fit the novel challenges posed by physical theories without spacetime. We construe understanding as a matter of skill rather than just knowledge. The appeal is thus to understanding, rather than explanation, because we will be concerned with the tools that scientists have at their disposal for understanding these theories. Our central thesis is that such physical theories can provide scientific understanding, and that such understanding does not require spacetimes of any sort. Our argument consists of four consecutive steps: (a) We argue, from the general theory of scientific understanding, that although visualization is an oft-used tool for understanding, it is not a necessary condition for it; (b) we criticise certain metaphysical preconceptions which can stand in the way of recognising how intelligibility without spacetime can be had; (c) we catalogue tools for rendering theories without a spacetime intelligible; and (d) we give examples of cases in which understanding is attained without a spacetime, and explain what kind of understanding these examples provide. (shrink)

In 2006 was 'jij' volgens het Amerikaanse blad 'Time Magazine' als individu de persoon van het jaar. Tien jaar later is het selfietijdperk helemaal doorgebroken. Het 'ik' staat centraal en onze identiteit heeft veel weg van een bouwpakket uit een doe-het-zelf zaak. In het boek 'De mythe van de ik-dentiteit' staan auteurs uit uiteenlopende maatschappelijke velden stil bij de consequenties en uitdagingen van deze maatschappelijke evolutie. Met bijdragen van Erik Borgman, Marc Calmeyn, Marc Colpaert, Paul Delva, Patrick Develtere, Erik Galle, (...) Anja T?Kindt, Ivan Van de Cloot, Leen Van den Neste, Guido Vanheeswijck, Frédéric Van Leeuw, Ellen Van Stichel, Christoffel Waelkens en Walter Weyns. (shrink)

This volume includes the critical edition of five apologias (1522-1529) in which Erasmus defended his New Testament translation and commentary (1516)against Diego López de Zúñiga and Sancho Carranza. The edition is partly based on manuscript sources never used before.

This second volume of the Amsterdam edition of the apologias contains the critical edition of the Latin text of one of the apologias against the Spanish theologian Jacobus Lopis Stunica.

This volume includes the critical edition of five apologias in which Erasmus defended his New Testament translation and commentary against Diego López de Zúñiga and Sancho Carranza. The edition is partly based on manuscript sources never used before.

"The fact that religions show internal variation and develop over time is not only a problem for believers, but has also long engaged scholars. This is especially true for the religions of the ancient world, where the mere idea of innovation in religious matters evoked notions of revolution and destruction. The present volume brings together articles that study this transformation, ranging from broad overviews to detailed case-studies."--BOOK JACKET.

Understanding is a central aim of science and highly important in present-day society. But what precisely is scientific understanding and how can it be achieved? This book answers these questions, through philosophical analysis and historical case studies, and presents a philosophical theory of scientific understanding that highlights its contextual nature.

What makes teaching philosophy of science to non-philosophy students different from teaching it to philosophy students, and how should lecturers in philosophy adapt to an audience of practitioners of a field of study that they are reflecting on? In this paper we address this question by analyzing the differences between these student groups, and based on this analysis we make suggestions as to how philosophy of science can be taught to non-philosophy students in an effective and attractive way. Starting-point is (...) the observation that not only the background knowledge and interests of these students but also the aims of the respective courses will differ. We present a comparative analysis of the demands and conditions for teaching philosophy of science to the different types of students, focusing on learning objectives and didactic approaches. Next, we apply our analysis to a concrete example, the role of values in science, and discuss how this may be taught to either philosophy students or non-philosophy students. Finally, we discuss an alternative format for teaching philosophy to non-philosophy students. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of how policymakers could deliberately influence processes of technology development. Using the development of wind turbines in Denmark as an example, the article describes the frames of meaning guiding the actions of those involved in the three subprocesses of policymaking, the generation of new technologies, and the management of the firms that bring new artifacts to the market. The three types of actors share an interest in one notion: the meaning of a technological artifact. This (...) notion, however, plays a different role in the respective frames of meaning of the actors. For policymakers and managers, it is an instrumental notion. For technologists, it provides guidance to their activities. The shared interest affords the possibility of reaching common action with only congruent meanings. Interactive forms of technology assessment can play a central role in bringing about such congruent meanings and thus in influencing the generation of new technologies. (shrink)

It is often claimed—especially by scientific realists—that science provides understanding of the world only if its theories are (at least approximately) true descriptions of reality, in its observable as well as unobservable aspects. This paper critically examines this ‘realist thesis’ concerning understanding. A crucial problem for the realist thesis is that (as study of the history and practice of science reveals) understanding is frequently obtained via theories and models that appear to be highly unrealistic or even completely fictional. So we (...) face the dilemma of either giving up the realist thesis that understanding requires truth, or allowing for the possibility that in many if not all practical cases we do not have scientific understanding. I will argue that the first horn is preferable: the link between understanding and truth can be severed. This becomes a live option if we abandon the traditional view that scientific understanding is a special type of knowledge. While this view implies that understanding must be factive, I avoid this implication by identifying understanding with a skill rather than with knowledge. I will develop the idea that understanding phenomena consists in the ability to use a theory to generate predictions of the target system’s behavior. This implies that the crucial condition for understanding is not truth but intelligibility of the theory, where intelligibility is defined as the value that scientists attribute to the theoretical virtues that facilitate the construction of models of the phenomena. I will show, first, that my account accords with the way practicing scientists conceive of understanding, and second, that it allows for the use of idealized or fictional models and theories in achieving understanding. (shrink)

Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of (...) how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions. (shrink)

The act of understanding is at the heart of all scientific activity; without it any ostensibly scientific activity is as sterile as that of a high school student substituting numbers into a formula. Ordinary language often uses visual metaphors in connection with understanding. When we finally understand what someone is trying to point out to us, we exclaim: “I see!” When someone really understands a subject matter, we say that she has “insight”. There appears to be a link between visualization (...) and understanding, and between visualizability and intelligibility. This applies in science no less than in daily life: visualization is regarded as a useful means of achieving scientific understanding, even in the .. (shrink)

This volume offers a critical re-assessment of the thought of Ernst Bloch, best-known for his groundbreaking study The Principle of Hope and one of the most significant European thinkers and public intellectuals of the twentieth century. It explores Bloch's life, work and reception; his debt to Marx and Hegel; his central concepts of hope and utopia; his affinities with philosophers such as Gramsci and Zizek; and his radical reframing of our understanding of history, society and culture. Above all, this volume (...) examines the relevance of Bloch's ideas today, in a world still shot through with economic inequality and social injustice. Contributors are: Agata Bielik-Robson, Ivan Boldyrev, Henk de Berg, Sam Dolbear, Vincent Geoghegan, Holger Glinka, Loren Goldman, Douglas Kellner, Cat Moir, Jan Rehmann, Nina Rismal, Johan Siebers, and Peter Thompson. (shrink)

What is the future of science and technology? Will academic research become a commodity like so much else? Will technology and science become ever more intertwined? Such questions concern anyone to whom science and technology matter. A philosophical approach can shed light on them, as Hans Radder has amply shown. This volume contains essays by colleagues and friends that highlight the wide variety of topics he has addressed in his work. Whether it is the interaction between science, technology and society, (...) the nature of scientific experimentation, or the scientific realism question, Radder's approach is always acute and committed. 0With contributions by Henk van den Belt, James Robert Brown, Kai Eigner, Andrew Feenberg, Steve Fuller, Makoto Katsumori, Peter Kirschenmann, Christian Krijnen, Peter Kroes, Chunglin Kwa, Sabina Leonelli, Loet Leydesdorff, Alfred Nordmann, Pieter Pekelharing, Arthur Petersen, Henk de Regt, Angela Roothaan, László Ropolyi, Frits Schipper, and Astrid Schwarz. (shrink)

John Rawls wordt algemeen beschouwd als een van de meest invloedrijke filosofen van de voorbije eeuw. In zijn befaamde boek 'A Theory of Justice' uit 1971 staat het principe van de rechtvaardigheid centraal dat hij beschouwt als de belangrijkste maatschappelijke waarde in de samenleving. Mensen zijn fundamenteel gelijkwaardig. Daarom is het voor Rawls evident dat een ethisch systeem zich richt tot iedereen. Natuurlijk beseft hij dat mensen niet gelijk zijn of beter gezegd, niet over dezelfde begaafdheden beschikken noch over dezelfde (...) startposities. Waar het bij hem op aan komt is de onvrijwillige achterstanden, dus achterstanden die niet gebaseerd zijn op vrijwillige keuze, weg te werken. De denktank Liberales organiseerde tussen 2012 en 2016 vijf John Rawlslezingen. Ze werden gehouden door schrijver en oud-politicus Jan Terlouw, en de hoogleraren Frank Vandenbroucke, Paul Cliteur, Philippe Van Parijs en Patrick Loobuyck. De inleidingen werden gegeven door de Liberales-kernleden Daniël Boomsma, Claude Nijs, Kasper Ossenblok, Andreas Tirez en Dirk Verhofstadt. 0Het doel van deze lezingen was om het gedachtegoed van Rawls bekend te maken bij een breder publiek en te toetsen aan de hedendaagse politieke, sociaaleconomische en maatschappelijke omstandigheden. In dit boek zijn de John Rawlslezingen en de inleidingen gebundeld. (shrink)

The chapters in this book highlight the multifaceted nature of the process of scientific research.

This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science. First, I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding, defended by Carl Hempel and J. D. Trout. I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science. Subsequently, I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of ‘intelligibility’ and a contextual account of scientific understanding based (...) on this notion. †To contact the author, please write to: Faculty of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)